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a b s t r a c t 
Remanufacturing as well as quality improving innovations are important activities to improve sustain- 
ability. However, when coexisting in one company, their interaction is not clear. On the one hand, past 
research found a positive impact of remanufacturing on product quality. On the other hand, remanufac- 
turing was shown to be negatively affected by an industry’s technology trajectory of quality improve- 
ments. 
Using a stylized model of endogenous product quality improvement and remanufacturing we ﬁnd that 
the main driver of the contradicting results is the change in manufacturing costs caused by improving 
product quality. A strong increase in manufacturing costs due to product quality improvement may in- 
duce the ﬁrm to take up remanufacturing when introducing the new product. Conversely, a small im- 
pact of product quality improvement on manufacturing costs reverses this effect and may indeed lead 
the ﬁrm to cease remanufacturing when introducing the new product. We ﬁnd that the latter outcome is 
never beneﬁcial from an environmental point of view, while the former always is. With endogenous prod- 
uct quality improving innovation we then characterize conditions where a remanufacturing manufacturer 
would take a different product quality improvement decision than a non-remanufacturing manufacturer. 
We observe that remanufacturing stiﬂes (stimulates) product quality improvement when manufacturing 
cost of quality improved products are low (high). Neither of the two results are exclusively beneﬁcial or 
detrimental from an environmental perspective and we characterize the conditions under which product 
quality improvement is preferable. 
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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0. Introduction 
Remanufacturing has been identiﬁed as a resource eﬃcient and
ustainable strategy within the circular economy: consumption of
aw materials can be signiﬁcantly reduced and energy use and
missions to air and water can be avoided by keeping the core
omponents in use for longer ( Parker et al., 2015 ). However, man-
facturers, particularly in innovative industries, constantly invest
n new products with improved quality to cater for consumer de-
ands. Intuitively, if quality improvement cycles are short, con-
umers’ propensity of purchasing the remanufactured products will
e smaller since the improved quality features are not included. On
he other hand, higher quality of the new product may – through
n associated increase in new product price – reduce this effect
n the short run. At the same time, increasingly harsh regulations∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: marc.reimann@uni-graz.at (M. Reimann). 
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377-2217/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article uosed on manufacturers regarding re-use and remanufacturing will
ave an impact on strategic decision making including new prod-
ct quality improvement. Particularly, if remanufacturing is seen as
 value proposition (as advocated in Guide Jr. & Van Wassenhove,
009 ) a ﬁrm may ﬁnd it less appealing to constantly improve prod-
ct quality if that reduces remanufacturing proﬁtability. 
However, the underlying tradeoffs are not yet fully understood
n both academia and practice as indicated by contradicting re-
ults. While companies like Xerox and Apple have been reman-
facturing and reselling used products for a long time, Samsung
nly recently started to remarket its remanufactured smartphones
 Etherington, 2016 ). Moreover, while the smartphone industry is
ast moving and Apple as well as Samsung are at the forefront
f innovation, Xerox has been less of a success story in terms of
apitalizing on its inventions ( Mui, 2012 ). The example of Xerox is
lso used as a motivation in two scientiﬁc papers that come up
ith opposing results. Galbreth, Boyaci, and Verter (2013) men-
ion that a key element, the explicit consideration of incremen-nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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P  tal quality improving innovation, is missing in the extant body of
academic work on remanufacturing. They investigate the impact
of the rate of quality improvements on the product reuse deci-
sion and ﬁnd that quality improving innovation can reduce the
quantity of remanufactured products. On the contrary, Atasu and
Souza (2013) , the ﬁrst study to analyse the impact of product re-
covery on quality choice under voluntary and mandated product
take-back environments, show that remanufacturing may increase
the optimal quality provision of a manufacturer. Note that, while
quality choice is only one aspect of innovation in general (be-
sides timing, product or process innovation, among many others),
in Galbreth et al. (2013) incremental innovation is synonymous
to quality choice/improvement. Moreover, though Galbreth et al.
(2013) focus on quality improvement through incremental innova-
tion, while Atasu and Souza (2013) study a one-shot quality choice
decision, the market impact, based on the evaluations of products
with different quality, are analogous in the two models. 
Our paper aims at contributing to further our understanding
about the critical relationship between product quality improve-
ment and remanufacturing by revisiting these contradictory re-
sults. 
In particular, we aim to answer the following questions: 
• (Under what conditions) Will product quality improvement
stimulate or reduce the manufacturer’s remanufacturing ef-
forts? 
• Does remanufacturing increase or decrease the manufacturer’s
propensity to improve product quality? 
• What are the environmental implications of the manufacturer’s
proﬁt-optimal strategy? 
As mentioned above, in Galbreth et al. (2013) quality improve-
ment is exogenously modeled by an industry trajectory and Atasu
and Souza (2013) use a static setting, which means the quality
decision is taken once and for all and there is no upgrade over
time. In this paper, we endogenize the product quality improve-
ment decision in a remanufacturing setting and develop a gener-
alized model to resolve the before mentioned contradicting results
from these two papers. 
Speciﬁcally, we consider a manufacturer facing the decision to
invest in product quality improvement and/or remanufacture its
used products. The situation is modelled as a two-period deci-
sion problem. At the outset, the manufacturer has the ﬁrst gen-
eration of a new product available. At the beginning of the ﬁrst
period, the manufacturer takes an investment decision that would
make a quality improved second generation of the new product
available in period 2. Further, the manufacturer makes its ﬁrst pe-
riod quantity decision for (ﬁrst generation) new products to sell
to the market. At the end of the ﬁrst period, used products are
collected. In the second period, those used products can then be
remanufactured and sold on the market to consumers with lower
willingness-to-pay for the product. Besides, the manufacturer again
decides its quantity of new products to manufacture and sell to
the market. Depending on the investment decision taken prior to
period 1, these new products will be ﬁrst (if no investment was
taken) or second (if the manufacturer did invest) generation of the
product. We assume that consumers’ willingness-to-pay for sec-
ond generation units is larger than for ﬁrst generation units. Note
that the same assumption is also adopted by Atasu and Souza
(2013) and Galbreth et al. (2013) . In both periods, the products’
prices are determined by the manufacturer’s quantity decisions. 
Using this stylized model, we explore the interaction between
remanufacturing and product quality improvement. Speciﬁcally, we
focus on the impact of quality-dependent manufacturing cost on
the relationship between remanufacturing and new product quality
improvement. We ﬁnd that when manufacturing eﬃciency is high
(i.e. quality has little impact on manufacturing cost), if commit-ed to remanufacturing, the manufacturer has less willingness to
nvest in product quality improvement. On the other hand, product
uality improvement indeed hurts remanufacturing, in that it may
nduce the manufacturer to give up remanufacturing after intro-
ucing the second generation new product. These results are com-
letely reversed when manufacturing eﬃciency is low (i.e. qual-
ty has a strong impact on manufacturing cost). Similarly, for high
anufacturing eﬃciency we ﬁnd that increased quality increases
esource consumption which we use as a proxy for environmental
mpact, while it reduces total resource consumption when man-
facturing eﬃciency is low. Moreover, we ﬁnd that under cer-
ain conditions giving up remanufacturing after improving product
uality may beneﬁt the environment when compared with reman-
facturing and foregoing quality improvement. 
Our results have important implications for both ﬁrm decision
akers and policy makers. Understanding the implications prod-
ct quality improvement will have on remanufacturing, manufac-
urers can better focus their R&D efforts on projects that ideally
erform on both economic and environmental aspects. Moreover,
he results support ﬁrms in deciding which products may be worth
emanufacturing. From a policy-maker’s point of view, our results
ighlight the fact that encouraging remanufacturing through legis-
ation ultimately aimed at improving product design may in fact
ave the inverse effect of stiﬂing product quality improvement.
oreover, from an environmental point of view, encouraging prod-
ct quality improvement may be preferable over encouraging re-
anufacturing. 
Overall, we make the following contributions: ﬁrst, we endoge-
ize the product quality improvement decision in a remanufactur-
ng setting and develop a stylised model to study the interaction
etween remanufacturing and product quality improvement. Sec-
nd, we derive the conditions under which remanufacturing and
roduct quality improvement are mutually beneﬁcial or exclusive.
hird, we investigate the environmental implications of improv-
ng product quality and remanufacturing in terms of the total re-
ource consumption and show what is preferred by the manufac-
urer might not be environmentally friendly. The results can help
o inform policy makers in terms of environmental regulations. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
ection 2 reviews the related literature and posits our research
n the literature. Section 3 provides the problem setting and
odelling framework. We analyse the model, derive managerial
nsights and discuss environmental implications in Section 4 .
ection 5 concludes the paper. Proofs of all our theoretical results
re provided in the appendix. 
. Literature review 
Our study builds on three streams of literature: remanufactur-
ng and closed-loop supply chains, product design in CLSCs as well
s the interaction between product innovation and remanufactur-
ng. 
Remanufacturing and closed-loop supply chain management
ave been extensively studied in the past decades. Souza
2013) and Govindan, Soleimani, and Kannan (2015) provide very
omprehensive literature reviews in this area. Atasu (2016) inte-
rates the latest and most inﬂuential research in an edited book. 
Traditionally, the research on remanufacturing and closed loop
upply chain management mostly focuses on the competition and
arket segmentation between new and remanufactured products
 Atasu, Sarvary, & Van Wassenhove, 2008; Ferrer & Swaminathan,
006; 2010; Souza, 2013 ), inventory management ( Corum, Vay-
ay, & Bayraktar, 2014; Hsueh, 2011; Toktay, Wein, & Zenios, 20 0 0;
anoni, Ferretti, & Tang, 2006; Zhou & Yu, 2011 ), or pricing for
sed products ( Guide Jr., Teunter, & Van Wassenhove, 2003; Liang,
okharel, & Lim, 2009; Xiong et al., 2014 ). This stream of re-
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1 To simplify the analysis we assume that collection cost are zero. Since adding 
collection cost will, regardless of any other decisions, just reduce the proﬁtability 
of remanufacturing this simpliﬁcation will not alter the qualitative insights we pro- 
vide. earch usually assumes that the technology and product design are
xogenously given and do not change during the decision hori-
on. Therefore, the main focus is the interaction between new
nd remanufactured products. Although remanufactured products
ay cannibalize the new product market, the overall proﬁt may
ncrease due to the low cost of remanufactured products ( Souza,
013 ). As indicated above, none of these models consider the prod-
ct design or product quality improvement issues in a remanufac-
uring context. 
Green product design, also known as design for environment,
ddresses environmental issues through product design ( Chen,
0 01 ). Chen (20 01) develop a quality-based model to analyse
he conﬂicts between traditional and environmental attributes.
rishnan and Lacourbe (2011) model ﬁrm’s product decisions in-
luding both functional and environmental quality dimensions, and
dentify the conditions under which both proﬁt and environmental
uality are maximized. Raz, Druehl, and Blass (2013) analyse the
esign for environment issues in a newsvendor setting. The ﬁrm
an invest in manufacturing stage environmental improvement and
sage stage environmental improvement. They show that overpro-
uction may increase the overall environmental impact although
he unit environmental impact decreases due to the investment in
he design. These papers include the environmental attributes in
roduct design decisions, however, ignore product reuse options. 
Recent years witnessed a growing trend in researching the in-
eraction between product design and used product recovery. Atasu
nd Souza (2013) investigate how product reuse impacts product
uality choice, and ﬁnd that recovery may lead to higher product
uality. They also show the role that the form of product recov-
ry, recovery cost structure and product take-back legislation play
or ﬁrm’s quality choice. Örsdemir, Kemahlolu-Ziya, and Parlaktürk
2014) extend Atasu and Souza (2013) to the oligopoly setting and
tudy the competitive quality choice in presence of remanufac-
uring. They ﬁnd that when an OEM competes with an indepen-
ent remanufacturer, remanufacturing may reduce the quality and
ncrease environmental impact. Debo, Toktay, and Van Wassen-
ove (2005) study the joint pricing and remanufacturability deci-
ion faced by a manufacturer introducing a remanufacturable prod-
ct. While the optimal remanufacturability level is determined by
he consumer proﬁle ( Debo et al., 2005 ), if the ﬁrm can make
oth product quality and remanufacturability decisions, the ﬁrm
ould couple increased remanufacturing with higher product qual-
ty ( Gu, Chhajed, Petruzzi, & Yalabik, 2015 ). Subramanian, Ferguson,
nd Toktay (2013) investigate the impact of remanufacturing on
he component commonality decision, and derive the conditions
nder which the OEM’s commonality decision may be reversed.
u (2012) studies the design-for-disassembly problem in a sup-
ly chain formed by an original equipment manufacturer produc-
ng new products and a remanufacturer remanufacturing the used
roducts. Using a two-period model, the author derives manage-
ial insights for the manufacturer and remanufacturer. The product
esign decision in the above papers is made once and for all at
he beginning of the decision period, either for functional improve-
ent or environmental improvement. Conversely, we assume that
he manufacturer can improve product quality over time. 
The interaction between product innovation and remanufactur-
ng is rarely studied in the literature. Limited research only focuses
n the impact of product innovation on remanufacturing ( Boyaci,
erter, & Galbreth, 2016; Galbreth et al., 2013 ). Galbreth et al.
2013) show that incremental innovation may reduce the value
f remanufacturing and thus can have a negative economic ef-
ect. This is also true under radical innovation ( Boyaci et al., 2016 ).
oyaci et al. (2016) investigate a manufacturer’s decision regarding
he design for reusability and the product reuse decision consid-
ring exogenous innovation including a deterministic incremental
nnovation rate and a stochastic radical innovation that may occurver time. However, given that innovation in the above two papers
s exogenous it is not part of the manufacturer’s strategic decision
pace. 
Extending existing research, we consider endogenous product
uality improvement, thereby studying product quality decisions
n a simple dynamic setting, and model consumer preferences for
ew and remanufactured products as a function of new product
uality. Summarizing, our research investigates the mutual impacts
etween product quality improvement and remanufacturing. 
. Problem setting 
We consider a monopolist manufacturer’s joint strategic deci-
ions on remanufacturing and product quality improvement and
bstract from the optimal timing decisions for new product in-
roductions by focusing on a two-period model. Every period cor-
esponds to a life-cycle of the product. In the ﬁrst period the
anufacturer sells the ﬁrst generation of new products at price
 1 n to heterogeneous consumers with a willingness-to-pay of v n ∼
[0 , 1] . Per unit manufacturing cost is given by c 1 n < 1. 
Prior to the beginning of period 1 (i.e. at time t = 0 ) the man-
facturer can take the strategic decision whether or not to invest
n new product R&D. Without investment, the manufacturer still
ells the ﬁrst generation new product in period 2 under unchanged
onsumer valuation. If he invests a quality improved second gener-
tion new product will be available for period 2 (i.e. at time t = 1 ).
ollowing the extant literature we assume that the product qual-
ty improvement cycle coincides with the product life cycle (see
.g. in Atasu & Souza, 2013; Ovchinnikov, Blass, & Raz, 2014 ) and
hat consumers are willing to pay a premium for improved goods
nd services (see e.g. Atasu & Souza, 2013; Galbreth et al., 2013 ).
e model this by a parameter θ2 n ≥1, such that a consumer’s
illingness-to-pay in period 2 is given by θ2 n v n . If the manufac-
urer sticks with the ﬁrst generation product we have θ2 n = 1 ,
hile we mimic product quality improvement by letting θ2 n > 1.
ur goal is to analyse the maximum R&D investment k a manu-
acturer is willing to undertake to obtain a given level of θ2 n > 1
ssociated with the second generation quality improved product.
onsequently, the relationship between k and θ2 n will be a result
f our analysis. 
The manufacturing cost in period 2 also depends on the gen-
ration of new products offered and in general is given by c 2 n =
 1 n θ
ξ
2 n 
. This functional form is commonly used in modelling pro-
uction cost of a product with improved quality (see Krishnan &
acourbe, 2011 and references therein). Here ξ ≥0 corresponds to
he second generation manufacturing eﬃciency associated with
he improved product features. For example, in Atasu and Souza
2013) a convex-increasing relationship is modeled by setting ξ =
 . In our analysis below, we will show that the choice of ξ cru-
ially inﬂuences the structural insights about the relationship be-
ween product quality improvement and remanufacturing. Clearly,
ithout quality improvement, i.e. when the generation 1 product
s sold in period 2, the cost is given by c 2 n = c 1 n . 
At the end of the ﬁrst period used units are returned by the
onsumers. Without loss of generality, and in line with our as-
umption concerning the product life-cycle, we assume that all
rst period sales q 1 n are returned. The manufacturer can reman-
facture those units at per unit cost c r = αc 1 n and sell them on
 secondary market at price p 2 r . 
1 Here α < 1 models the reman-
facturing eﬃciency compared to new production. Following the
xtant literature we assume that consumers are homogeneous
916 G. Li et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 913–925 
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The associated quantities and prices are shown in Table 1 . in their discounted valuation for remanufactured products. Their
willingness-to-pay for remanufactured products is given by θr v n ,
where θ r < 1. 
Summarizing, the manufacturer decides: (i) at time 0, whether
or not to invest in R&D to obtain a 2nd generation quality im-
proved new product for period 2, as well as how many 1st gen-
eration new units q 1 n to manufacture and offer to the market; (ii)
at time 1, how many new and remanufactured units q 2 n and q 2 r ,
respectively, to offer to the market. 
3.1. The demand model 
As mentioned above, we consider heterogeneous consumers
with willingness-to-pay v n ∼ U[0 , 1] for the ﬁrst generation new
product. The valuations for new products of the same generation
are the same across different periods because only one new prod-
uct exists in the market at any given time (this is in line with Debo
et al., 2005 ). 
In the ﬁrst period, the net utility of a consumer buying the new
product is U 1 n = v n − p 1 n . The condition U 1 n ≥0 yields the inverse
market demand for ﬁrst generation new products in period 1 as
p 1 n = 1 − q 1 n . 
In the second period, new and remanufactured products will
compete for market share. Given the willingness-to-pay for reman-
ufactured products mentioned above, the net utility of a consumer
buying a remanufactured product is U 2 r = θr v n − p 2 r . The con-
sumer’s net utility of buying a new product depends on whether
the new product will be ﬁrst or second generation (i.e. whether or
not the manufacturer undertook product R&D at time t = 0 ) and,
the same as Atasu and Souza (2013) , is given by U 2 n = θ2 n v n − p 2 n .
Note that also in Galbreth et al. (2013) an analogous consumer util-
ity model is used to study incremental product innovation. While
in their context the new product evaluation is normalized to 1 (to
reﬂect the industry trajectory) and remanufactured products are
devalued with increased quality of the new product (yielding an
evaluation of θr 
θ2 n 
), the relative evaluations of new over remanufac-
tured products are the same as in our model, namely 
θ2 n 
θr 
. 
Using consumer rationality in their purchasing decisions we ob-
tain the second period inverse demand functions: 
p 2 r = θr (1 − q 2 n − q 2 r ) (1)
and 
p 2 n = θ2 n (1 − q 2 n ) − θr q 2 r . (2)
3.2. The manufacturer’s decision problem 
Under these demand functions the manufacturer’s proﬁt before
investment cost can be written as 
(θ2 n , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) 
= (p 1 n − c 1 n ) q 1 n + (p 2 n − c 2 n ) q 2 n + (p 2 r − c r ) q 2 r . (3)
Using the indicator function 1 θ2 n > 1 to reﬂect whether the man-
ufacturer undertook product R&D or not, the optimization problem
then is to maximize proﬁts including investment cost as follows: 
max 
θ2 n ,q 1 n ,q 2 n ,q 2 r 
(θ2 n , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) − k 1 θ2 n > 1 (4)
s.t. 0 ≤ q 2 r ≤ q 1 n (5)
q 2 n ≥ 0 (6)
Here k is the investment cost. Note that remanufacturing can
only be proﬁtable at all under the assumption θ r > αc . 1 n .3. Measuring (virgin) resource consumption 
Our model shown above maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt as a func-
ion of its product quality improvement and remanufacturing de-
isions. We follow some of the extant literature and measure total
esource (virgin material) consumption as a proxy for environmen-
al impact (see e.g. Galbreth et al., 2013 ). 
Assume that the unit resource consumption of new products
n both periods – i.e. regardless of their generation – is γ n 
nd the unit resource consumption of the remanufactured prod-
ct is γ r < γ n . Note that the assumption about the identical re-
ource consumption of new ﬁrst and second generation products
s reasonable for functional quality improvement, for example the
Phone series, which is quite common in current practice. 
The total resource consumption of a ﬁrm in our model is then
iven by 
 EI = (q 1 n + q 2 n ) γn + q 2 r γr . 
. Model analysis 
We can solve the ﬁrm’s problem by ﬁrst obtaining the optimal
rst period production decision q 1 n as well as the optimal second
eriod production decision q 2 n and remanufacturing decision q 2 r 
or given θ2 n . Afterwards, by comparing the differential of proﬁts
ith ( θ2 n > 1) and without ( θ2 n = 1 ) quality improvement with the
nvestment cost k , we can obtain the optimal product quality im-
rovement decision θ2 n . 
Lemma 1 provides the optimal production strategy along with
he associated quantities and prices for a given level of θ2 n . 
emma 1. To exclude the meaningless solution where the manufac-
urer stops new production in period 2 when θ2 n = 1 (i.e. there is no
nnovation) we assume α > c 1 n + θ
2 
r −1 
c 1 n θr 
. 
Case 1: ξ ≤1 : The manufacturer’s optimal second period quantity
ecisions for given θ2 n are characterized by three different operational
egions: 
I No remanufacturing but new production 
α > θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
II Partial remanufacturing and new production 
θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
≤ α ≤ θr θξ−1 2 n 
III Full remanufacturing and new production 
α < θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
Case 2: ξ > 1 : The manufacturer’s optimal second period quantity
ecisions for given θ2 n are characterized by ﬁve different operational
egions: 
α > θ r : 
I No remanufacturing but new production 
α > θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
II Partial remanufacturing and new production 
θξ
2 n 
− θ2 n −θr c 1 n < α ≤ θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
IV Partial remanufacturing but no new production 
α ≤ θξ
2 n 
− θ2 n −θr c 1 n 
α ≤ θ r : 
II Partial remanufacturing and new production 
α ≥ θr θξ−1 2 n −
(1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
III Full remanufacturing and new production 
(1 + θr ) c 1 n θ
ξ
2 n 
−(θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θr 
− 1 < α < θr θξ−1 2 n −
(1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
V Full remanufacturing but no new production 
α ≤ (1 + θr ) c 1 n θ
ξ
2 n 
−(θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θr 
− 1 
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Table 1 
Production quantities and associated prices. 
Optimal quantities and prices 
q 1 n q 2 n q 2 r 
Regions p 1 n p 2 n p 2 r 
I 1 −c 1 n 
2 
1 −c 1 n θξ−1 2 n 
2 
0 
1+ c 1 n 
2 
θ2 n (1+ c 1 n θξ−1 2 n ) 
2 
–
II 1 −c 1 n 
2 
θ2 n −c 1 n θξ2 n −(θr −αc 1 n ) 
2(θ2 n −θr ) 
θξ
2 n 
θr c 1 n −θ2 n αc 1 n 
2 θr (θ2 n − θr ) 
1+ c 1 n 
2 
θ2 n (1+ c 1 n θξ−1 2 n ) 
2 
αc 1 n + θr 
2 
III 
(1 −c 1 n (1+ α)) θ2 n + c 1 n θr θξ2 n 
2[ θr (θ2 n −θr )+ θ2 n ] 
c 1 n (1+ α) θr +(θ2 n −θr −c 1 n θξ2 n )(1+ θr ) 
2[ θr (θ2 n −θr )+ θ2 n ] q 1 n 
1 − (1 −c 1 n (1+ α)) θ2 n + c 1 n θr θ
ξ
2 n 
2[ θr (θ2 n −θr )+ θ2 n ] 
θ2 n (1+ c 1 n θξ−1 2 n ) 
2 
θr [(θ2 n −θr )(c 1 n (1+ α)+ θr )+ c 1 n θξ2 n + θr ] 
2[ θr (θ2 n −θr )+ θ2 n ] 
IV 1 −c 1 n 
2 
0 θr −c 1 n α
2 θr 
1+ c 1 n 
2 
– θr + c 1 n α
2 
V 1 −c 1 n (1+ α)+ θr 
2(1+ θr ) 0 q 1 n 
1+ c 1 n (1+ α)+ θr 
2(1+ θr ) –
θr (1+ c 1 n (1+ α)+ θr ) 
2(1+ θr ) 
Fig. 1. Operational regions under high ( ξ = 0 ) and low ( ξ = 2 ) second generation manufacturing eﬃciency ( θr = 0 . 8 , c 1 n = 0 . 6 ). 
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2 When α < θ2 r the result may hold but also may be reversed and gets quite un- 
intelligible. If requested, these results can be obtained from the authors. .1. The impact of product quality improvement on the 
emanufacturing decision 
Using Lemma 1 we can derive a strong result with respect to
he impact of θ2 n on the optimal production strategy (given by q 1 n ,
 2 n and q 2 r ) as a function of ξ . 
roposition 1. When ξ ≤1, an increase in θ2 n will have a detrimen-
al impact on remanufacturing. 
For ξ > 1, an increase in θ2 n will increase remanufacturing when-
ver c 1 n > 
θr 
θr +(ξ−1) θξ2 n 
. 
Fig. 1 visualizes these results for two special cases, namely ξ =
 and ξ = 2 , respectively. Note that, as mentioned above, the latter
ase corresponds to the setting used in Atasu and Souza (2013) . 
While for ξ ≤1 the manufacturer would switch from full re-
anufacturing to partial remanufacturing to no remanufacturing,
he opposite is true for ξ > 1. Note that for ξ > 1 the impact of in-
reasing θ2 n on the manufacturing cost of the product might not
e large enough when c 1 n ≤ θr 
θr +(ξ−1) θξ2 n 
. As a result, similar to the
ase ξ ≤1, a switch from full remanufacturing to partial remanu-
acturing can take place under ξ > 1 for relatively small c 1 n . Fur-
hermore, observe that for ξ > 1 the manufacturer would actually
nd it optimal to cease manufacturing new units in the second pe-
iod when θ2 n is too large (regions IV and V). Clearly, this implies
hat the associated manufacturing cost of the second generation
roduct would be prohibitive and the manufacturer would never
nvest in such a level of θ2 n . Thus, we need not further consider
he corresponding regions in our analysis. 
Comparing the decisions for low and high second generation
anufacturing eﬃciency under the remaining cases I–III we ob-
erve that q 1 n and q 2 r are never smaller, while q 2 n is always
maller under low second generation manufacturing eﬃciency.
his is straightforward, as the increased manufacturing cost under> 1 induce the manufacturer to increase the price of second gen-
ration new products p 2 n which reduces their appeal to consumers.
onsequently remanufactured products are more sought after. To
over the increased demand for remanufactured products without
aving to increase ﬁrst period supply too much, the manufacturer
ven charges a higher price for remanufactured products when
> 1. 
Unfortunately, further closed form analytical results for general
are not possible. Thus, in the following we will focus on the two
ases used in Fig. 1 to exemplify the results for low and high sec-
nd generation manufacturing eﬃciency. 
Let us ﬁrst turn to sensitivity analysis with respect to θ2 n . Un-
er ξ = 0 an increase in θ2 n will always decrease the volume of
emanufacturing both under partial and full remanufacturing. On
he other hand, under ξ = 2 the opposite is true, i.e. an increase
n θ2 n will always increase the volume of remanufacturing under
artial as well as full remanufacturing whenever α ≥ θ2 r . In the re-
ainder of this paper we will restrict ourselves to this case α ≥ θ2 r 
or the sake of readability. 2 
Note that for ξ = 0 our results are identical with the ﬁndings
rom Galbreth et al. (2013) – who use a linear relationship be-
ween quality and manufacturing cost, which is equivalent to set-
ing ξ = 1 in our model – whereafter a steeper industry trajectory
in our case a higher θ2 n ) reduces the value of remanufacturing.
owever, our more general formulation shows that these results
witch completely when ξ > 1. From a practical perspective this
mplies that the manufacturer needs to carefully analyse the rela-
ionship between product quality and manufacturing cost to eval-
ate the operational implications on the production quantities. 
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tWhen looking at the resource consumption associated with the
above discussion we get the following clear-cut result. 
Proposition 2. When ξ = 0 , improving product quality always in-
creases total resource consumption. 
When ξ = 2 , improving product quality always decreases total re-
source consumption for the remanufacturing ﬁrm. 
From Proposition 2 , we can see that when ξ = 0 , improving
product quality is always bad for the environment. The explana-
tion to that comes from the relative importance of two counter-
acting effects. On the one hand, we have the demand inducing,
market enlarging effect of introducing the second generation prod-
uct (and associated increase in total resource consumption). On the
other hand, we observe the reduction in market share with low
willingness-to-pay customers (and associated decrease in total re-
source consumption) who would only have bought the remanufac-
tured product whenever ξ = 0 . When ξ = 0 , the former effect is
dominant, explaining the ﬁnding. 
When ξ is high, the opposite can be observed. The demand
shrinking effect of introducing the second generation new product
due to increased manufacturing cost outweighs the market expan-
sion due to sales of remanufactured products to consumers who
would otherwise not have bought any product, thus driving the
environmental result. Note that this result also holds when reman-
ufacturing itself is not environmentally beneﬁcial (as shown in e.g.
Galbreth et al., 2013 ). 
To summarize, our results so far suggest that higher product
quality which induces less remanufacturing is always bad for the
environment. Conversely, when higher quality enhances remanu-
facturing the environmental effect is positive. Below we will ex-
tend our analysis to product quality improvement decision. 
Based on our theoretical analysis above, we can now move to
the quality-improvement/investment decision. We are interested in
the question under what conditions the manufacturer is actually
better off by introducing the second generation product, and un-
der what conditions he should stick with his ﬁrst generation new
product. To do so, we can compute a threshold cost k ′ = (θ2 n >
1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) − (θ2 n = 1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) which corresponds to the
proﬁt differential between the cases with and without quality im-
provement. Clearly, the manufacturer is better off by introducing
the second generation product as long as the associated invest-
ment cost k is lower than the threshold k ′ . 
Proposition 3 summarizes the results. 
Proposition 3. When ξ = 0 , the threshold k ′ is non-negative and
strictly increasing in θ2 n . When ξ = 2 , the threshold k ′ is non-positive
and strictly decreasing in θ2 n whenever α < θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n . 
Thus, when ξ = 0 , higher product quality is always beneﬁcial
and the manufacturer is willing to invest more for higher qual-
ity. For ξ = 0 we also ﬁnd that with increasing α the ﬁrm is will-
ing to invest more for the same quality θ2 n of the new product,
yet at a diminishing rate. This is due to the reduced cannibaliza-
tion between new and remanufactured products under low reman-
ufacturing eﬃciency (i.e. high α). In that case, the manufacturer
can charge a higher price for second generation new units with-
out facing too many consumers switching to remanufactured prod-
ucts. Summarizing, product quality improvement hurts remanufac-
turing, and the effect increases when remanufacturing eﬃciency
decreases, i.e. α increases. 
Together with the fact that higher quality reduces the manufac-
turer’s propensity to remanufacture this leads to a case where the
manufacturer would remanufacture without improving new prod-
uct quality, but instead prefers to introduce the second generation
product and consequently stops to remanufacture when quality
improvement of the new product is suﬃciently radical, and secondeneration manufacturing eﬃciency as well as remanufacturing ef-
ciency are high. 
On the other hand, for ξ = 2 the investment relationship is less
lear cut. Due to low second generation manufacturing eﬃciency,
 higher θ2 n may actually reduce the proﬁts even before account-
ng for the investment cost. Thus, the manufacturer may be bet-
er off by sticking with the ﬁrst generation product even if invest-
ent cost were zero. This is always true when α is low as given
y the condition in the proposition. In that case, the eﬃcient re-
anufacturing would be hurt by quality improvement of the new
roduct. Yet, if improving new product quality were proﬁtable after
ccounting for the investment cost, the manufacturer introducing
he second generation product may actually start remanufacturing.
hen remanufacturing eﬃciency decreases ( α increases), the man-
facturer is willing to invest progressively less for the same qual-
ty θ2 n of the new product. Here quality improvement of the new
roduct boosts remanufacturing, and the effect increases when re-
anufacturing eﬃciency increases, i.e. α decreases. 
Above, we have seen that – depending on ξ – introducing a
uﬃciently radical product quality improvement (i.e. a large θ2 n )
ay induce the manufacturer to stop or take-up remanufactur-
ng. This informs the managers that product quality improvement
s the better choice if second generation manufacturing is eﬃ-
ient. Otherwise, the trade-off between product quality improve-
ent and remanufacturing is less clear-cut and needs more care-
ul analysis. From the government policy maker’s perspective, the
bove result shows that for some industry (with low eﬃciency of
ew generation manufacturing), it is not necessary to incentivize
he ﬁrm to do remanufacturing. However, for competitive indus-
ries, where new generation manufacturing is eﬃcient (e.g. smart
hones), product quality improvement is preferred and hurts re-
anufacturing. Moreover, product quality improvement always in-
reases total resource consumption. In this situation, necessary ac-
ions should be taken from the government (e.g. WEEE directive)
o that remanufacturing is considered by ﬁrms. 
.2. The impact of remanufacturing on the decision of product 
uality improvement 
Up to now we have investigated the decision of product qual-
ty improvement under the assumption that the ﬁrm in question
s willing to remanufacture. In this section we want to understand
ow the strategic decision to engage in remanufacturing affects the
ecision of product quality improvement. To do so we consider two
rms. The ﬁrst ﬁrm is the one we have looked at so far, i.e. it is
illing to remanufacture when c r is small enough. Its optimization
roblem is characterized by the regions shown in Fig. 1 . Alterna-
ively, we will consider a second ﬁrm that has taken the strategic
ecision not to remanufacture at all. As an example, in practice
uch a ﬁrm may fear cannibalization of their new product sales
hrough the offering of remanufactured units, or it may not have,
r want to set up, the necessary logistics infrastructure for collect-
ng the used units. 
Our research question then can be reformulated to: Does the
rst ﬁrm invest more in product quality improvement than the
econd ﬁrm and if so under what conditions? 
Proposition 4 answers this question with a strong result. 
roposition 4. Under high second generation manufacturing eﬃ-
iency ( ξ = 0 ), the remanufacturing ﬁrm will never be willing to in-
est more in new product quality improvement than the ﬁrm that
oes not remanufacture. 
Under low second generation manufacturing eﬃciency ( ξ = 2 ), the
emanufacturing ﬁrm will never be willing to invest less in new
roduct quality improvement than the ﬁrm that does not remanufac-
ure, if α ≥ θ r . 
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Fig. 2. The relationship between remanufacturing and product quality improve- 
ment as a function of (quality-improvement-induced) manufacturing eﬃciency and 
remanufacturing eﬃciency. 
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tive. 
3 Note that we have analysed this question as well as some of the other results 
from a social perspective as well. We focused on consumer surplus but the results 
are not clear-cut and little insightful in general. For the sake of completeness we 
present the more interesting ones in Appendix B . When ξ = 0 , the main driver for the result is the fact that for
he diversiﬁed ﬁrm the positive effect of quality improvement on
he market for new products is partly offset by the negative ef-
ect this quality improvement has on the remanufactured product.
oreover, increased remanufacturing eﬃciency – i.e. smaller α –
agniﬁes the negative effect of remanufacturing on product qual-
ty improvement since this implies more competition between the
wo products. 
On the other hand, when ξ = 2 the condition α ≥ θ r implies
hat without improving quality of the new product the remanu-
acturing ﬁrm would not remanufacture (due to low remanufactur-
ng eﬃciency). Thus, without quality improvement the two ﬁrms
re identical in their decisions. However, above we have seen that
nder quality improvement the remanufacturing ﬁrm may be will-
ng to take up remanufacturing. Since it would not do so if it were
ot proﬁtable, its proﬁt must be larger than without remanufactur-
ng. Thus, we get the proposed result. In other words, the market
xpansion effect of introducing the remanufactured product dom-
nates the cannibalization effect reducing new product sales when
he 2nd generation product is introduced. 
Finally, Fig. 2 summarizes our main economic insights on the
elationship between remanufacturing and product quality im-
rovement. 
Summarizing, product quality improvement and remanufactur-
ng are always mutually beneﬁcial when second generation manu-
acturing eﬃciency and remanufacturing eﬃciency are both low ( ξ
nd α are high). In that case competition between the new and re-
anufactured products is weak and the market expansion effects
f both product quality improvement and remanufacturing dom-
nate. When second generation manufacturing eﬃciency and re-
anufacturing eﬃciency are both high, the opposite is true since
he cannibalization effect between the two products drives the re-
ult. Thus, either product quality improvement without remanufac-
uring or remanufacturing without product quality improvement is
referable. 
When second generation manufacturing eﬃciency is high but
emanufacturing eﬃciency is low we get the trivial result that
here is no remanufacturing. Consequently, the product quality
mprovement decision only depends on the primary market ef-
ects it induces. Finally, when second generation manufacturing
ﬃciency is low but remanufacturing eﬃciency is high, which of
he above mentioned two scenarios applies depends on the initialanufacturing cost for ﬁrst generation products c 1 n . When c 1 n is
igh, remanufacturing and product quality improvement are mu-
ually beneﬁcial, while when c 1 n is low they are mutually exclu-
ive. Clearly, in the former case the competition between the new
nd remanufactured product is weak, while in the latter case it is
trong, thereby driving the result. 
.3. Product quality improvement without remanufacturing or 
emanufacturing without product quality improvement: Which is 
ore environmentally beneﬁcial? 
Above, Fig. 2 summarizes that product quality improvement
nd remanufacturing are either independent or mutually beneﬁ-
ial in most cases. Only for ξ = 0 and low α we ﬁnd that prod-
ct quality improvement may actually hurt remanufacturing and
ice versa. In that situation the interesting question arises whether
roduct quality improvement or remanufacturing is to be favored
rom an environmental point of view. The following proposition
ummarizes our ﬁndings. 
roposition 5. Under high second generation manufacturing
ﬃciency ( ξ = 0 ), product quality improvement by the non-
emanufacturing ﬁrm is environmentally preferable over remanu-
acturing by the non-quality-improvement ﬁrm when 
• the remanufacturing ﬁrm’s optimal decision is partial remanufac-
turing and 
θ2 n ≤ 1 −θr 1 −α or 
θ2 n > 
1 −θr 
1 −α and 
γn 
γr 
≤ θ2 n (θr −α) 
θr (θ2 n −1+ θr −θ2 n α) 
• the remanufacturing ﬁrm’s optimal decision is full remanufactur-
ing and 
θ2 n ≤ c 1 n [1+ θr (1 −θr )] θr (2 −θr )+ c 1 n (1 −θr )(1+ α−θr ) or 
θ2 n > 
c 1 n [1+ θr (1 −θr )] 
θr (2 −θr )+ c 1 n (1 −θr )(1+ α−θr ) and 
γn 
γr 
≤ θ2 n [1 −c 1 n (1+ α−θr )] 
θ2 n [ θr (2 −θr )+ c 1 n (1 −θr )(1+ α−θr )] −c 1 n [1+ θr (1 −θr )] 
Thus, when the second generation manufacturing eﬃciency is
igh ( = 0), remanufacturing that disencourages product quality im-
rovement may actually be bad from a sustainability point of view.
his is particularly true when product quality improvement is in-
remental. In that case, the non-remanufacturing ﬁrm will enjoy
 large environmental advantage from not serving the lower-end
onsumers. This advantage dominates as long as the market in-
rease in the demand for new units due to product quality im-
rovement is not too large. In all other cases, i.e. when product
uality improvement is of a more radical type, the environmental
esults depend on the relative per unit resource consumption ad-
antage of remanufactured products over new units in the obvious
ay. 3 
This result has important implications for policy makers. Al-
hough remanufacturing is good for the environment on a per unit
asis due to the reduced consumption of materials, energy etc. it
s not necessarily good when considering the total quantity, be-
ause it may induce more consumption which may cause more en-
ironmental impact. Therefore, overincentivizing on remanufactur- 
ng is not a good idea. In this sense, encouraging product quality
mprovement could be preferable from the environment’s perspec-
920 G. Li et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 913–925 
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 5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the joint decision making about
product quality improvement and remanufacturing by a monop-
olist manufacturer. Product quality improvement increases con-
sumer’s willingness-to-pay for the new product, which at the same
time reduces the attractiveness of remanufactured products. Go-
ing beyond the existing literature we endogenize the product qual-
ity improvement decision and investigate the impact of the manu-
facturing eﬃciency associated with improving product quality. We
conﬁrm the ﬁndings from previous research concerning the nega-
tive impact of improving product quality on remanufacturing, yet
only for the case where manufacturing eﬃciency associated with
quality improved product is high. When manufacturing eﬃciency
for the second generation product is low, the result reverses in that
introducing that product will actually stimulate remanufacturing.
Therefore, whether product quality improvement and remanufac-
turing co-exist in one company depends on the eﬃciency of prod-
uct quality improvement. 
In a second step we analyse how the strategic decision to re-
manufacture inﬂuences a manufacturer’s propensity to improve
product quality. Again, the effect will be positive or negative de-
pending on the manufacturing cost for the second generation prod-
uct. Thus, we characterize the conditions under which remanufac-
turing and product quality improvement are mutually beneﬁcial or
mutually exclusive. We further link these ﬁndings with environ-
mental (in terms of resource consumption) performance and show
that what is economically preferable may not be beneﬁcial with
respect to resource consumption. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that from
an environmental point of view product quality improvement by
a non-remanufacturing ﬁrm may be preferable over remanufactur-
ing without product quality improvement. 
From a policy-maker’s perspective these results highlight an in-
triguing dilemma. Short product quality improvement cycles are
seen as one key element in the planned obsolescence debate and
our results suggest that remanufacturing may counteract (too)
early introduction of new product generations when manufactur-
ing eﬃciency of the quality improved product is low. But when
manufacturing eﬃciency is high, remanufacturing is not preferred
compared to product quality improvement. Moreover, from the
perspective of the environment, although remanufacturing is good
on a per unit basis, it may actually be harmful in terms of the to-
tal resource consumption by foregoing some quality improvement
if remanufacturing promotes that. Our results suggest that the an-
swer to this dilemma crucially depends on the type of product
quality improvement and its impact on manufacturing cost. 
Clearly our model is not without limitations to provide answers
to the more general aspects with respect to industry dynamics
and environmental policy. However, our work can be seen as a
ﬁrst step towards a richer understanding of sustainability, by link-
ing short-term (through remanufacturing) and long-term (through
quality improvement) economic and environmental effects. The
next step will be to extend the model by incorporating competi-
tion through an oligopolistic setting. Clearly, product quality im-
provement is driven by competitive pressure as much as by con-
sumer demand. It will be interesting to see whether our results
about foregoing product quality improvement still hold under such
a setting. Moreover, in an oligopolistic setting we can also study
whether heterogeneity about the strategic decision to remanufac-
ture prevails and how it affects the industry dynamics with re-
spect to product quality improvement. A second possible research
thread is to make the model more comprehensive by including the
decision which type of product quality improvement to pursue.
In this paper we have focused on product quality improvement
that has no direct effect on the per unit environmental impact
of new products. Clearly, this contrasts with green product qualitymprovement, where a new product generation may reduce the en-
rgy consumption in the use phase (e.g. washing machines). Un-
erstanding those things in more detail will further enhance ﬁrm
nd public decision making. 
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ppendix A. Proofs 
roof of Lemma 1. Using the shadow prices λ1 for the remanufac-
uring constraint as well as λn and λr for the non-negativity con-
traints on q 2 n and q 2 r we can write the Lagrangean of the problem
s 
 = (1 − q 1 n − c 1 n ) q 1 n + (θ2 n (1 − q 2 n ) − θr q 2 r − c 1 n θξ2 n ) q 2 n 
+ (θr (1 − q 2 n − q 2 r ) − αc 1 n ) q 2 r − λ1 (q 2 r − q 1 n ) 
+ λn q 2 n + λr q 2 r . (7)
From the ﬁrst-order-conditions of L from Eq. (7) we obtain 
 1 n = 1 − c 1 n + λ1 
2 
(8)
 2 n = 
(c 1 n α + θ2 n − c 1 n θξ2 n − θr + λ1 + λn − λr ) 
2(θ2 n − θr ) 
(9)
 2 r = 
−c 1 n αθ2 n + c 1 n θξ2 n θr − θ2 n λ1 − θr λn + θ2 n λr 
2 θr (θ2 n − θr ) 
(10)
1 (q 2 r − q 1 n ) = 0 (11)
n q 2 n = 0 (12)
r q 2 r = 0 (13)
 ≤ q 2 r ≤ q 1 n (14)
 2 n ≥ 0 . (15)
It is easy to verify that the objective function is jointly concave
n the production quantities such that a solution of the system of
qs. (8) –(15) will be an optimum. Given the three lagrangean mul-
ipliers λ1 , λn and λr there are eight possible cases. Note that the
wo cases where λr > 0 and λ1 > 0 at the same time do not ex-
st, since they imply that q 2 r = q 1 n = 0 . This is impossible, since
 1 n = 0 is excluded by the assumption c 1 n < 1. Thirdly, the case
here λr > 0 and λn > 0 does not make sense either since it would
mply that there is no production at all in the second period,
.e. q 2 r = q 2 n = 0 . This could only happen when θ r ≤αc 1 n which is
gain excluded by assumption. 
Thus ﬁve possible cases remain. The quantities q 1 n , q 2 n and q 2 r 
nd associated prices p 1 n , p 2 n and p 2 r for each of these cases are
eadily obtained by plugging the values for λ1 , λn and λr into con-
itions (8) –(10) as well as the inverse demand functions. 
Let us now consider the case existence conditions. The ﬁrst
ase (denoted by I) implies that λr > 0 while λ1 = λn = 0 . Solving
he condition (10) for λr at q 2 r = 0 we obtain λr = 
c 1 n (αθ2 n −θξ2 n θr ) 
θ2 n 
.
r ≥0 whenever α ≥ θξ−1 2 n θr . Moreover, when ξ > 1 this implies
hat α > θ r . This concludes the proof for this case. 
Let us now turn to the other extreme case V, where λ1 > 0
nd λn > 0, while λr = 0 . From the conditions q 2 r = q 1 n and
 2 n = 0 we can compute λ1 and λn as λ1 = c 1 n (θr −α) 1+ θr and λn =
−θ2 n (1+ θr )+ c 1 n θξ2 n (1+ θr )+ θr (1 −c 1 n (1+ α)+ θr ) 
1+ θr . From λ1 > 0 we get directly
G. Li et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 271 (2018) 913–925 921 
θ  
t  
w  
i  
c
 
w  
w  
q  
t  
λ  
t  
w  
p
 
λ  
d  
q
w  
f
 
λ  
 
α  
 
b  
u
 
w  
t
 
q  
I  
θ  
s  
T  
w  
n
w  
V  
p
P  
a
 
i  
b  
i  
r  
r
 
c  
s  
b  
t  
l  
I  
t  
u  
p
P  
i  
T  
 
a  
a
 
g  
T  
i  
g
ﬁ  
−
w  
0  
T  
θ
e
c  
θ
1  
θ  
ﬁ  
I  
e
P  
o  
1  
f
 
t  
k  
u  
a  
t
 
s
=
=r > α while λn > 0 yields α < (1 + θr ) c 1 n θ
ξ
2 n 
−(θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θr 
− 1 . Moreover,
he FOC of λn w.r.t. θ2 n is strictly negative when ξ ≤1. Together
ith the fact that – by model assumption – this case does not ex-
st for θ2 n = 1 , we get that case V only exists when ξ > 1 which
oncludes the proof for this case. 
Case IV implies that λ1 = λr = 0 , while λn > 0. Setting q 2 n = 0
e obtain λn = −c 1 n α − θ2 n + c 1 n θξ2 n + θr ≥ 0 . This condition holds
henever α ≤ θξ
2 n 
− θ2 n −θr c 1 n . Plugging λn into the condition (10) for
 2 r and subsequently checking the condition q 2 r < q 1 n it turns out
hat this only holds when α > θ r . Analogous to case V, the FOC of
n w.r.t. θ2 n is strictly negative when ξ ≤1. Together with the fact
hat –by model assumption– this case does not exist for θ2 n = 1 ,
e get that case IV only exists when ξ > 1. This concludes the
roof for this case. 
In case II none of the constraints is binding, hence λ1 = λn =
r = 0 . From the condition q 2 r > 0 we get α ≤ θξ−1 2 n θr , which is
ominated by α ≤ θ r whenever ξ > 1. Analogously, the condition
 2 n > 0 yields α > θ
ξ
2 n 
− θ2 n −θr c 1 n while from the condition q 2 r < q 1 n 
e obtain α > θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
. Together with the results
or case IV above this concludes the proof for this case. 
Finally, let us turn to case III, where λr = λn = 0 while
1 > 0. From the condition q 2 r = q 1 n we can compute λ1 =
θr (−θ2 n + θr )+ c 1 n (−αθ2 n +(θ2 n + θξ2 n −θr ) θr ) 
θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
. The requirement λ1 > 0 yields
< θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
. The requirement q 2 n > 0 yields α >
(1 + θr ) c 1 n θ
ξ
2 n 
−(θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θr 
− 1 . Both of these conditions on α can only
e jointly satisﬁed when c 1 n ≤ θ2 n −θr 
θξ
2 n 
−θr 
. It is easy to verify that
nder this condition the upper bound on α satisﬁes θr θ
ξ−1 
2 n 
−
(1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
≤ θr . Thus, when θ r ≥α the case always exists
hile when θ r < α it can never exist. This concludes the proof for
his case. 
To conclude the proof let us consider the condition to ensure
 2 n > 0 when θ2 n = 1 . This implies that we have to rule out regions
V and V when θ2 n = 1 . Let us ﬁrst consider region IV. Plugging
2 n = 1 into the threshold for α yields α ≤ 1 − 1 −θr c 1 n . However, ob-
erve from Lemma 1 that region IV can only exist when α > θ r .
hese two constraints are mutually exclusive, whenever c 1 n < 1
hich holds by assumption. Thus, when θ2 n = 1 region IV does
ot exist. Using the same analysis for region V yields α ≤ c 1 n −1+ θ2 r 
c 1 n θr 
hich is consistent with the condition α ≤ θ r , implying that region
 may exist when θ2 n = 1 . Thus, we obtain our threshold to ensure
ositive second period new production under θ2 n = 1 . 
roof of Proposition 1. Using the results from Lemma 1 we will
ddress the two cases ξ ≤1 and ξ > 1 separately. 
When ξ ≤1 the lower boundary on α for Case I is non-
ncreasing in θ2 n and strictly decreasing whenever ξ < 1. The lower
oundary on α for Case II is strictly decreasing in θ2 n . Thus, an
ncrease in θ2 n will induce the manufacturer to switch from full
emanufacturing to partial remanufacturing and ultimately to no
emanufacturing. 
When ξ > 1 the lower boundary on α for Case I is strictly in-
reasing in θ2 n . Similarly, the lower bound on α for Case II is
trictly increasing in θ2 n whenever α > θ r . When α ≤ θ r the lower
ound on α for Case II increases whenever c 1 n > 
θr 
θr +(ξ−1) θξ2 n 
. Note
hat this constraint is softened as ξ or θ2 n increase. Finally, the
ower bound on α for Case III is again strictly increasing in θ2 n .
n other words an increase in θ2 n will induce the manufacturer
o switch from no remanufacturing to partial remanufacturing andltimately to full remanufacturing in general. This concludes the
roof. 
roof of Proposition 2. When ξ = 0 , the total environmental
mpacts TEI in regions I-III respectively are 
γn (2 θ2 n −c 1 n θ2 n −c 1 n ) 
2 θ2 n 
,
(2 −c 1 n ) γn 
2 −
c 1 n (1 −α)(γn −γr ) 
2(θ2 n −θr ) −
αc 1 n γr 
2 θr 
, and 
θ2 n γr + c 1 n [ −γn −(α+1) θ2 n (γn + γr )+ θr ((α+1) γn + γr )]+ γn [ θ2 n (θr +2) −θr (θr +1)] 
2(θ2 n (θr +1) −θ2 r ) 
. 
he corresponding ﬁrst derivatives with respect to θ2 n are 
c 1 n γn 
2 θ2 
2 n 
,
c 1 n (1 −α)(γn −γr ) 
2(θ2 n −θr ) 2 
, and 
(γn −γr θr )[ c 1 n (1 −αθr )+ θr ] 
2[ θ2 r −θ2 n (θr +1)] 2 
. Obviously, all of them
re positive. As a result, when ξ = 0 , product quality improvement
lways increases total environmental impact. 
When ξ = 2 , the total environmental impact TEI in re-
ion I is − 1 2 γn [ c 1 n (θ2 n + 1) − 2] . The ﬁrst derivative of
EI in region I with respect to θ2 n is − 1 2 c 1 n γn which
s negative. The total environmental impact TEI in re-
ion II is 
c 1 n [ γn θr (α−θ2 2 n −θ2 n + θr )+ θ2 n γr (θ2 n θr −α)]+2 γn θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
2 θr (θ2 n −θr ) . The 
rst derivative of TEI in region II with respect to θ2 n is
c 1 n (γn −γr )(α+ θ2 2 n −2 θ2 n θr ) 
2(θ2 n −θr ) 2 
< 0 . This holds, since for α ≥ θ2 r 
e can easily show that α + θ2 
2 n 
− 2 θ2 n θr > (θ2 n − θr ) 2 >
 . The total environmental impact TEI in region III is
γn [ θr ((α+1) c 1 n + θ2 n −1) −θ2 n (c 1 n (α+ θ2 n +1) −2) −θ2 r ]+ θ2 n γr [1 −c 1 n (α−θ2 n θr +1)] 
2[ θ2 n (θr +1) −θ2 r ] 
. 
he ﬁrst derivative of TEI in region III with respect to
2 n is 
(γn −γr θr )[ θr −c 1 n (θ2 2 n (θr +1) −2 θ2 n θ2 r +(α+1) θr )] 
2[ θ2 r −θ2 n (θr +1)] 2 
. From the case 
xistence condition α < θ2 n θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) c 1 n θ2 n , we know 
 1 n > 
θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
. Some algebraic manipulation yields
θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
− θr 
θ2 
2 n 
+ θ2 
2 n 
θr −2 θ2 n θ2 r + αθr + θr 
= θr (θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ
2 
r )(α+ θ2 2 n −2 θ2 n θr ) 
(−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r )(θ2 2 n + θ2 2 n θr −2 θ2 n θ2 r + αθr + θr ) 
> 
θr (θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r )(θ2 n −θr ) 2 
(−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r )(θ2 2 n + θ2 2 n θr −2 θ2 n θ2 r + αθr + θr ) 
> 0 . Here 
2 
2 n + θ2 2 n θr − 2 θ2 n θ2 r + αθr + θr = θ2 n (θ2 n + θ2 n θr − 2 θ2 r ) + (α + 
) θr > 0 . So c 1 n > 
θr 
θ2 
2 n 
+ θ2 
2 n 
θr −2 θ2 n θ2 r + αθr + θr 
. In other words,
r − c 1 n [ θ2 2 n (θr + 1) − 2 θ2 n θ2 r + (α + 1) θr ] < 0 . As a result, The
rst derivative of TEI in region III with respect to θ2 n is negative.
n sum, product quality improvement always decreases total
nvironmental impact when ξ = 2 . 
roof of Proposition 3. Note that the shape of k ′ only depends
n the proﬁt ( θ2 n > 1, q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) since the proﬁt (θ2 n =
 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) is a constant for given parameters. Thus, we now
ocus on the impact of θ2 n on ( θ2 n > 1, q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ). 
From Lemma 1 we know that the manufacturer can be in one of
he ﬁve cases I, II, III, IV, V after improving product quality. We also
now that cases IV and V imply that the manufacturer stops man-
facturing new units in the second period. Clearly in those cases
ny investment k would be lost, i.e. k ′ = 0 and we need not fur-
her consider those two cases. 
Let us analyse the remaining three cases for ξ = 0 and ξ = 2 ,
eparately. When ξ = 0 , the proﬁt in the three cases is given by 
Case I: 
(θ2 n > 1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) = c 
2 
1 n 
+ θ2 n +(−4+ c 1 n ) c 1 n θ2 n + θ2 2 n 
4 θ2 n 
Case II: 
(θ2 n > 1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) 
 
(1+ θ2 n −4 c 1 n )(θ2 n −θr ) θr + c 2 1 n (α2 θ2 n −2 αθr +(1+ θ2 n −θr ) θr ) 
4(θ2 n −θr ) θr 
Case III: 
(θ2 n > 1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) 
 
θ2 n (1+ θ2 n −θr )(1+ θr )+ c 2 1 n (1+(1+ α) 2 θ2 n −θr −2 αθr ) 
4(θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r ) 
+ 2 c 1 n (θr + θ2 r −θ2 n (2+ α+ θr )) 
4(θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r ) 
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wIt is easy to verify that in all three cases the ﬁrst derivative
w.r.t. θ2 n is strictly positive over the respective feasible ranges. This
concludes the proof for ξ = 0 . 
Now we turn to ξ = 2 . The proﬁt in the three cases is given by 
Case I: 
(θ2 n > 1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) = 1+ θ2 n + c 1 n (−2+ c 1 n −2 θ
2 
2 n 
+ c 1 n θ3 2 n ) 
4 
Case II: 
(θ2 n > 1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) = (1+ θ2 n −2 c 1 n (1+ θ
2 
2 n 
))(θ2 n −θr ) θr 
4(θ2 n −θr ) θr 
+ c 
2 
1 n 
(α2 θ2 n −2 αθ2 2 n θr +(θ2 n + θ4 2 n −θr ) θr ) 
4(θ2 n −θr ) θr 
Case III: 
(θ2 n > 1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) 
= θ2 n (1+ θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ
2 
r + c 2 1 n ((1+ α) 2 + θ3 2 n + θ2 n (−2 −2 α+ θ2 2 n ) θr )) 
4(θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r ) 
− θ2 n (2 c 1 n (1+ α+ θ2 n (θ2 n −θr )(1+ θr ))) 
4(θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r ) 
In case I, the ﬁrst derivative w.r.t. θ2 n is positive over the entire
case domain whenever c 1 n ≤ θr 3 α . It is positive for θ2 n < 1 3 c 1 n if 
θr 
3 α <
c 1 n < 
1 
3 . Whenever c 1 n ≥ 1 3 it is always negative. In that latter case
it implies that k ′ is negative for the entire case domain. 
In case II, we get an increasing k ′ as θ2 n increases whenever
α ≥ θ2 r and c 1 n < θ2 n −θr α+3 θ2 
2 n 
−4 θ2 n θr 
. 
In case III, k ′ is strictly decreasing in θ2 n over the entire case
domain when α ≥ θ2 r . 
Proof of Proposition 4. Observe that the ﬁrm that never reman-
ufactures is always in region I. Without product quality improve-
ment, i.e. when θ2 n = 1 , its optimal strategy and proﬁt are given
by 
q 1 n = 1 −c 1 n 2 , p 1 n = 
1+ c 1 n 
2 
q 2 n = 1 −c 1 n 2 , p 2 n = 
1+ c 1 n 
2 
q 2 r = 0 
(1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) = (1 −c 1 n ) 
2 
2 . 
Obviously this proﬁt is independent of ξ . 
From the proof of Proposition 3 we know that under product
quality improvement the ﬁrm’s optimal proﬁt depends on ξ . For
ξ = 0 we get 
(θ2 n , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) = (1 − c 1 n ) 
2 
4 
+ (θ2 n − c 1 n ) 
2 
4 θ2 n 
. 
Thus, for the ﬁrm that does not remanufacture at all the max-
imum investment for improving product quality at ξ = 0 is given
by 
k ≤ (θ2 n − c 1 n ) 
2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 − c 1 n ) 
2 
4 
. 
Analogously, for ξ = 2 we get the proﬁt 
(θ2 n , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) = (1 − c 1 n ) 
2 
4 
+ θ2 n (1 − c 1 n θ2 n ) 
2 
4 
and the maximum investment for a given θ2 n is given by 
k ≤ θ2 n (1 − c 1 n θ2 n ) 
2 
4 
− (1 − c 1 n ) 
2 
4 
. 
Now observe that our focal ﬁrm willing to remanufacture could
be in region I, II or III before and after improving product quality.
When the ﬁrm is in region I before and after improving product
quality its strategy, proﬁts and maximum investment are obviously
identical to the non-remanufacturing ﬁrm (since remanufacturing
is just not proﬁtable). We need not further consider that case. 
For the remaining analysis let us ﬁrst consider the situation
ξ = 0 . In that setting, the ﬁrm will be in case II or III before prod-
uct quality improvement, i.e. when θ2 n = 1 , whenever α < θ r . Ob-
serve that by deﬁnition this implies that the ﬁrst ﬁrm makes a
larger proﬁt than it would make without remanufacturing, i.e. be-
fore product quality improvement our focal ﬁrm makes a larger
proﬁt than ﬁrm 2. After improving product quality ﬁrm 1 could end up in regions
, II or III. Observe ﬁrst that when it ends up in region I, the maxi-
um investment k the manufacturer is willing to make in order to
each a given θ2 n > 1 is then determined by the proﬁt differential
ith and without product quality improvement. From Lemma 1 we
an infer that the manufacturer will be in region II for θ2 n = 1
henever θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n ≤ α ≤ θr . In that case the maximum
cceptable investment k is computed as 
k ≤ I (θ2 n , q 1 n , q 2 n , 0) − II (1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) . Plugging in all the
rices and quantities yields k ≤ (θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 −
c 2 
1 n 
(θr −α) 2 
4 θr (1 −θr ) .
nalogously, when θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n > α the manufacturer will
e in region III without investment and the associated maximum
cceptable investment k is computed by k ≤ I (θ2 n , q 1 n , q 2 n , 0) −
I I I (1 , q 1 n , q 2 n , q 2 r ) . Again, by simply plugging in all the prices and
uantities associated with the two scenarios, we obtain 
k ≤ (θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −θr ) 2 (1 −c 1 n ) 2 +(1 −αc 1 n ) 2 
4[ θr (1 −θr )+1] + 
(1 −θr )[(1 −θr )+2 c 1 n (θr −αc 1 n )] 
4[ θr (1 −θr )+1] . Comparing the above bounds on k
ith the bound k ≤ (θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 obtained for ﬁrm 2 we get
hat product quality improvement is hindered by remanufacturing
henever: 
• θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n ≤ α < θr 
(θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 ≥ k ≥
(θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 −
c 2 
1 n 
(θr −α) 2 
4 θr (1 −θr ) 
• α < θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n 
(θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 ≥ k ≥
(θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −θr ) 2 (1 −c 1 n ) 2 +(1 −αc 1 n ) 2 
4[ θr (1 −θr )+1] 
+ (1 −θr )[(1 −θr )+2 c 1 n (θr −αc 1 n )] 
4[ θr (1 −θr )+1] . 
In those cases, the ﬁrm that never remanufactures would im-
rove product quality, while the remanufacturing ﬁrm would not
mprove product quality. 
Similar analysis for the situations where the remanufacturing
rm ends up in region II and III after improving product qual-
ty yields the following results. When the ﬁrm ends up in region
I, product quality improvement is hindered by remanufacturing
henever: 
• θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n ≤ α < θr 
(θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 ≥ k ≥
θ2 n −2 c 1 n −(1 −c 1 n ) 2 
4 
+ c 
2 
1 n 
θr (1 −α)+ αc 2 1 n (θ2 n α−θr ) 
4(θ2 n −θr ) θr −
c 2 
1 n 
(θr −α) 2 
4 θr (1 −θr ) 
• α < θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n 
(θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 ≥ k ≥
θ2 n −2 c 1 n +(1 −c 1 n ) 2 
4 
+ c 
2 
1 n 
θr (1 −α)+ αc 2 1 n (θ2 n α−θr ) 
4(θ2 n −θr ) θr 
− (2 −θr )(1+ θr )+ c 
2 
1 n 
[1+(1+ α) 2 −θr −2 αθr ]+2 c 1 n (θ2 r −2 −α) 
4[ θr (1 −θr )+1] . 
When the ﬁrm ends up in region III, product quality improve-
ent is hindered by remanufacturing whenever: 
• α < θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (1 −θr ) c 1 n 
(θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 
4 θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) 2 4 ≥ k ≥
θ2 n (1+ θ2 n −θr )(1+ θr )+ c 2 1 n (1+(1+ α) 2 θ2 n −θr −2 αθr )+2 c 1 n (θr + θ2 r −θ2 n (2+ α+ θr )) 
4(θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r ) 
− (2 −θr )(1+ θr )+ c 
2 
1 n 
[1+(1+ α) 2 −θr −2 αθr ]+2 c 1 n (θ2 r −2 −α) 
4[ θr (1 −θr )+1] . 
This concludes the proof for ξ = 0 . 
Let us now turn to the case ξ = 2 . Analogously to above we
eed to consider the possible combinations of optimal strategies
efore and after improving product quality. From Lemma 1 we
now that for α > θ r the ﬁrm may switch from region I to region II.
n that case, remanufacturing helps product quality improvement
henever 
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2 n (θ2 n −1)(θ2 n −θr ) θr −2 c 1 n (θ2 2 n −1)(θ2 n −θr ) θr + c 2 1 n (α2 θ2 n + θ2 n (−1 −2 αθ2 n + θ3 2 n ) θr + θ2 r ) 
4(θ2 n −θr ) θr 
k ≥ θ2 n (1 −c 1 n θ2 n ) 2 4 −
(1 −c 1 n ) 2 
4 . 
Under that condition the remanufacturing ﬁrm would im-
rove product quality (and partially remanufacture ﬁrst generation
ores), while the non-remanufacturing ﬁrm would stick with its
rst generation product. 
roof of Proposition 5. Note that we are only interested in a sit-
ation where α < θr 
θ2 n 
as otherwise remanufacturing would never
e beneﬁcial. Under that condition the remanufacturing ﬁrm will
ither perform partial or full remanufacturing depending on α. 
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where the ﬁrm does partial re-
anufacturing. From Table 1 we can ﬁnd the optimal quantities
nd, given that the ﬁrm does not improve product quality, com-
ute total environmental impact T EI R −NI for θ2 n = 1 . Thus, we get
 EI R −NI = γn [2(1 −θr ) θr −c 1 n θr (2 −α−θr )]+ γr c 1 n (θr −α) 2 θr (1 −θr ) . Conversely for the
on-remanufacturing ﬁrm who improves product quality, the total
nvironmental impact 
T EI NR −I is given by T EI NR −I = γn (2 θ2 n −c 1 n θ2 n −c 1 n ) 2 θ2 n . Compar-
ng the two, our proposed result holds when T EI R −NI >
 EI NR −I . Straightforward algebraic manipulation yields
γr c 1 n θ2 n (θr −α)+ γn c 1 n θr [1 −θr −(1 −α) θ2 n ] 
2 θ2 n (1 −θr ) θr > 0 . Since α < 
θr 
θ2 n 
< θr , obvi-
usly T EI R −NI > T EI NR −I holds only when 1 − θr − (1 − α) θ2 n ≥ 0
r 1 − θr − (1 − α) θ2 n < 0 and γr c 1 n θ2 n (θr − α) + γn c 1 n θr [1 − θr −
(1 − α) θ2 n ] > 0 . By simple algebraic manipulation, we obtain
2 n ≤ 1 −θr 1 −α or θ2 n > 1 −θr 1 −α and 
γn 
γr 
≤ θ2 n (θr −α) 
θr (θ2 n −1+ θr −θ2 n α) . 
Considering now the case where the remanufacturing ﬁrm re-
anufactures all available used cores, analogous reasoning leads to
he condition 
γr [θ2 n −c 1 n θ2 n (1 + α−θr )] + γn [−θ2 n θr (2 −θr ) −θ2 n c 1 n (1 −θr )(1+ α−θr ) + c 1 n θr (1 −θr ) + c 1 n ] 
2 θ2 n [1+ θr (1 −θr )] .
imilarly, it is positive when −θ2 n θr (2 − θr ) − θ2 n c 1 n (1 −
r )(1 + α − θr ) + c 1 n θr (1 − θr ) + c 1 n ≥ 0 or −θ2 n θr (2 −
r ) − θ2 n c 1 n (1 − θr )(1 + α − θr ) + c 1 n θr (1 − θr ) + c 1 n < 0 
nd γr [ θ2 n − c 1 n θ2 n (1 + α − θr )] + γn [ −θ2 n θr (2 − θr ) −
2 n c 1 n (1 − θr )(1 + α − θr ) + c 1 n θr (1 − θr ) + c 1 n ] > 0 . By
imple algebraic manipulation, we obtain θ2 n ≤
c 1 n [1+ θr (1 −θr )] 
θr (2 −θr )+ c 1 n (1 −θr )(1+ α−θr ) or θ2 n > 
c 1 n [1+ θr (1 −θr )] 
θr (2 −θr )+ c 1 n (1 −θr )(1+ α−θr ) and 
γn 
γr 
≤ θ2 n [1 −c 1 n (1+ α−θr )] 
θ2 n [ θr (2 −θr )+ c 1 n (1 −θr )(1+ α−θr )] −c 1 n [1+ θr (1 −θr )] . 
ppendix B. Consumer surplus analysis 
Consumer surplus results from the difference between a prod-
ct’s price and a consumer’s willingness-to-pay for the product.
onsequently, total consumer surplus is the aggregate of these dif-
erences over all consumers purchasing either a new or a remanu-
actured product. 
Speciﬁcally, under remanufacturing total consumer surplus in
ur model is given by 
S = 
∫ 1 
p 1 n 
(v −p 1 n ) dv + 
∫ 1 
p 2 n −p 2 r 
θ2 n −θr 
(θ2 n v −p 2 n ) dv + 
∫ p 2 n −p 2 r 
θ2 n −θr 
p 2 r 
θr 
(θr v −p 2 r ) dv 
= (1 − p 1 n ) 
2 
2 
+ θ2 n 
2 
− p 2 n + (p 2 n − p 2 r ) 
2 
2(θ2 n − θr ) 
+ p 
2 
2 r 
2 θr 
Without remanufacturing this simpliﬁes to 
S = 
∫ 1 
p 1 n 
(v − p 1 n ) dv + 
∫ 1 
p 2 n 
θ2 n 
(θ2 n v − p 2 n ) dv 
= (1 − p 1 n ) 
2 
2 
+ (θ2 n − p 2 n ) 
2 
2 θ2 n 
Following Proposition 2 , we analyse the consumer surplus and
et the following result. roposition B1. When ξ = 0 , consumers will beneﬁt from product
uality improvement. 
When ξ = 2 , Consumers will beneﬁt from product quality im-
rovement when the manufacturer does not fully remanufacture if
2 n < 
1 
3 c 1 n 
, and never beneﬁts from product quality improvement un-
er full remanufacturing. 
roof. When ξ = 0 , the consumer surplus CS in region I is
c 2 
1 n 
θ2 n −4 c 1 n θ2 n + c 2 1 n + θ2 2 n + θ2 n 
8 θ2 n 
. The ﬁrst derivative of CS in region I with
espect to θ2 n is 
1 
8 [1 − ( 
c 1 n 
θ2 n 
) 2 ] > 0 . 
The consumer surplus CS in region II is 1 8 [ c 1 n ( 
(α−1) 2 c 1 n 
θ2 n −θr +
α2 c 1 n 
θr 
+ c 1 n − 4) + θ2 n + 1] . The ﬁrst derivative of CS in region II
ith respect to θ2 n is 
(αc 1 n −c 1 n + θ2 n −θr )(c 1 n −αc 1 n + θ2 n −θr ) 
8(θ2 n −θr ) 2 
. According to 
he region existence condition θr 
θ2 n 
− (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
≤ α, we know 
hat θ2 n ≥ (1 −c 1 n ) θ
2 
r + c 1 n θr 
αc 1 n +(1 −c 1 n ) θr . So αc 1 n − c 1 n + θ2 n − θr ≥ −(1 − α) c 1 n +
(1 −c 1 n ) θ2 r + c 1 n θr 
αc 1 n +(1 −c 1 n ) θr − θr = 
(1 −α) c 2 
1 n 
(θr −α) 
αc 1 n +(1 −c 1 n ) θr . From the case existence condi-
ion α < θr 
θ2 n 
, we know α < θ r . As a result αc 1 n − c 1 n + θ2 n − θr > 0 .
o the ﬁrst derivative of CS in region II with respect to θ2 n is pos-
tive. 
The consumer surplus CS in region III is 
c 2 
1 n 
[(α+1) 2 θ2 n −(2 α+1) θr +1]+2 c 1 n [ θ2 r + θr −θ2 n (α+ θr +2)]+ θ2 n (θr +1)(θ2 n −θr +1) 
8[ θ2 n (θr +1) −θ2 r ] 
. 
he ﬁrst derivative of CS in region III with respect to
2 n is 
(αc 1 n θr −c 1 n + θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r −θr )(−αc 1 n θr + c 1 n + θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r + θr ) 
8(θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r ) 2 
. 
ewriting the ﬁrst term in brackets in the nominator
(αc 1 n θr − c 1 n + θ2 n + θ2 n θr − θ2 r − θr ) we get ((θr + 1)(θ2 n − θr ) −
 1 n (1 − αθr )) . According to the assumption c 1 n < 1 −θ
2 
r 
1 −αθr , we know
(θr + 1)(θ2 n − θr ) − c 1 n (1 − αθr ) > (θr + 1)(θ2 n − θr ) − (1 − θ2 r ) = 
(θ2 n − 1)(θr + 1) > 0 . As a result, the ﬁrst derivative of CS in
egion III with respect to θ2 n is positive. In sum, when ξ = 0 ,
onsumers will always beneﬁt from product quality improvement. 
When ξ = 2 , the consumer surplus CS in region I is 1 8 [ c 2 1 n (θ3 2 n +
) − 2 c 1 n (θ2 2 n + 1) + θ2 n + 1] . The ﬁrst derivative of CS in region I
ith respect to θ2 n is 
1 
8 (c 1 n θ2 n − 1)(3 c 1 n θ2 n − 1) . It is positive for
2 n < 
1 
3 c 1 n 
and negative for θ2 n > 
1 
3 c 1 n 
. Please note that θ2 n < 
1 
c 1 n 
ecause of α ≥ θ2 n θ r and c 1 n < θr α . Therefore, if there is no reman-
facturing and θ2 n < 
1 
3 c 1 n 
consumer surplus increases with θ2 n ,
hich means product quality improvement beneﬁts consumers. 
The consumer surplus CS in region II is 1 8 (1 + θ2 n + c 1 n (−2(1 +
2 
2 n 
) + c 1 n (1 + (α−θ
2 
2 n 
) 2 
θ2 n −θr + 
α2 
θr 
))) . The ﬁrst derivative of CS in re-
ion II with respect to θ2 n is 
1 
8(θ2 n −θr ) 2 
(−θ2 n + c 1 n (−α + θ2 2 n ) +
r )(−θ2 n + θr + c 1 n (α + 3 θ2 2 n − 4 θ2 nθr )) . Let us now consider the
wo cases α > θ r and α ≤ θ r in turn. 
a) α > θ r From the case existence condition θ2 2 n −
θ2 n −θr 
c 1 n 
< α, we
know c 1 n (θ
2 
2 n − α) − θ2 n + θr < 0 . Therefore the sign of the
ﬁrst derivative is determined by −θ2 n + θr + c 1 n (α + 3 θ2 2 n −
4 θ2 n θr ) . Because α < θ2 n θ r , we have −θ2 n + θr + c 1 n (α + 3 θ2 2 n −
4 θ2 n θr ) < (−1 + 3 c 1 n θ2 n )(θ2 n − θr ) < 0 if θ2 n < 1 3 c 1 n . Therefore
the ﬁrst derivative is positive when θ2 n < 
1 
3 c 1 n 
. 
b) α ≤ θ r According to the case existence condition θr θ2 n −
(1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
≤ α, we have 
− θ2 n + c 1 n (−α + θ2 2 n ) + θr 
≤ − θ2 n − c 1 n θr θ2 n + (1 − c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n − θr ) 
θ2 n 
+ c 1 n θ2 2 n + θr 
= (θ2 n − θr )(−θ2 n + c 1 n θ
2 
2 n + θr − c 1 n θr ) 
θ
. 
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Fig. B.1. Consumer surplus difference when ξ = 2 . 
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 From the case existence condition θr θ2 n − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) c 1 n θ2 n ≤
α ≤ θr , we know θr − (θr θ2 n − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) c 1 n θ2 n ) =
θr (θ2 n −c 1 n θ2 2 n −θr + c 1 n θr ) 
c 1 n θ2 n 
> 0 . So θ2 n − c 1 n θ2 2 n − θr + c 1 n θr > 0 .
As a result, −θ2 n + c 1 n (−α + θ2 2 n ) + θr < 0 . Therefore, the ﬁrst
derivative is determined by −θ2 n + θr + c 1 n (α + 3 θ2 2 n − 4 θ2 n θr ) .
After some algebraic manipulation we get the desired result 
−θ2 n + θr + c 1 n (α + 3 θ2 2 n − 4 θ2 n θr ) 
= −θ2 n + θr + c 1 n α + 3 c 1 n θ2 2 n − 4 c 1 n θ2 n θr 
> −θ2 n + θr + c 1 n θr θ2 n − (1 − c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n − θr ) 
θ2 n 
+ 3 c 1 n θ2 2 n − 4 c 1 n θ2 n θr 
= (θ2 n − θr )(−θ2 n + 3 c 1 n θ
2 
2 n − θr + c 1 n θr ) 
θ2 n 
< 0 . 
The last inequality holds when θ2 n < 
1 
3 c 1 n 
. 
Therefore, in region II, when θ2 n < 
1 
3 c 1 n 
the ﬁrst derivative of
CS is positive, meaning consumers beneﬁt from product quality
improvement. 
The consumer surplus CS in region III is 
θ2 n [ c 2 1 n ((α + 1) 2 − 2(α + 1) θ2 n θr + θ3 2 n (θr + 1)) − 2 c 1 n (α + θ2 n (θ
8[ θ2 n (θr + 1) − θ2 r ] 
The ﬁrst derivative of CS in region III with respect to θ2 n is 
[(c 1 n θ2 2 n − θ2 n + θr )(θr + 1) − c 1 n θr (1 + α)][(3 c 1 n θ2 2 n − θ2 n )(θr + 1
8[ θ2 r − θ2 n (θr + 1)] 2 
From the case existence condition α > 
(θr +1)[ c 1 n θ2 2 n −(θ2 n −θr )] 
c 1 n θr 
− 1 ,
we know (c 1 n θ
2 
2 n 
− θ2 n + θr )(θr + 1) − c 1 n θr (1 + α) < 0 . From
the case existence condition α < θ2 n θr − (1 −c 1 n ) θr (θ2 n −θr ) c 1 n θ2 n , we
know c 1 n > 
θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
. From c 1 n > 
θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
>
θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r + θr 
3 θ2 
2 n 
(θr +1) −4 θ2 n θ2 r +(α+1) θr 
and 3 θ2 2 n (θr + 1) − 4 θ2 n θ2 r + (α +
1) θr = θ2 n (3 θ2 n + 3 θ2 n θr − 4 θ2 r ) + (α + 1) θr > 0 , we know
(3 c 1 n θ
2 
2 n 
− θ2 n )(θr + 1) − 4 c 1 n θ2 r θ2 n + θr [(α + 1) c 1 n + θr − 1] > 0 . 
So the ﬁrst derivative of CS in region III with respect to θ2 n is neg-
ative. Observe that 
θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r 
− θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r + θr 
3 θ2 
2 n 
(θr +1) −4 θ2 n θ2 r +(α+1) θr 
=
(θ2 n + θ2 n θr −θ2 r )(αθ2 n +2 θ2 2 n θr −4 θ2 n θ2 r −θ2 n θr + αθr + θ2 r ) 
(−αθ2 n + θ2 2 n θr + θ2 n θr −θ2 r )(3 θ2 2 n +3 θ2 2 n θr −4 θ2 n θ2 r + αθr + θr ) 
. Since α ≥ θ2 r ,
αθ2 n + 2 θ2 2 n θr − 4 θ2 n θ2 r − θ2 n θr + αθr + θ2 r ≥ θ2 n θ2 r + 2 θ2 2 n θr −
4 θ2 n θ
2 
r − θ2 n θr + θ3 r + θ2 r = θr (θ2 n − θr )(2 θ2 n − θr − 1) > 0 . 
The above result shows that for a low ξ , the gains for the high-
end consumers willing to pay a lot for the second generation prod-
ucts outweigh the losses for the lower-end consumers who can no
longer buy a remanufactured product, thereby driving the results
on the social aspects. 
However, when the manufacturing eﬃciency is low ( ξ = 2 ), full
remanufacturing is never good for consumers. Partial or no reman-
ufacturing may beneﬁt consumers only when product quality im-
provement is small. 
Following Proposition 5 , we analyse the implications on con-
sumer surplus of those results. We have the following result. 
Proposition B2. Under high second generation manufacturing eﬃ-
ciency ( ξ = 0 ), from a social point of view, the non-remanufacturing
ﬁrm that improves product quality provides a higher consumer surplus
than the remanufacturing ﬁrm that foregoes product quality improve-
ment only when the quality improvement is suﬃciently radical (i.e.
θ is large enough). 2 n )(θ2 n − θr ) + 1) + (θr + 1)(θ2 n − θr + 1)] 
. 
4 c 1 n θ2 r θ2 n + θr ((α + 1) c 1 n + θr − 1)] 
. 
The proof of Proposition B2 is straightforward. When ξ = 0 ,
onsumer surplus is always increasing with θ2 n , therefore, there
lways exists a point above which the consumer surplus of the
on-remanufacturing ﬁrm that improves product quality exceeds
hat from the remanufacturing ﬁrm that foregoes product quality
mprovement. 
However, under ξ = 2 , i.e. when second generation manufac-
uring eﬃciency is low, the result is not conclusive. We use a sim-
le example to illustrate this case. Assume α = 0 . 2 , c 1 n = 0 . 3 , θr =
 . 6 , we draw the difference of consumer surpluses from the two
ompanies C S NR −I −C S R −NI as a function of θ2 n in Fig. B.1 , where
S NR −I denotes consumer surplus with the non-remanufacturing
rm that improves product quality and CS R −NI denotes consumer
urplus with the remanufacturing ﬁrm that forgoes product qual-
ty improvement. From Fig. B.1 , we can see that different from the
ase of high manufacturing eﬃciency, when the manufacturing ef-
ciency is low, radical product quality improvement (larger θ2 n )
annot guarantee a higher consumer surplus. 
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